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ON THE DIFFICULTY OF MAKING DECISIONS WITHIN THE EU-25 
 









In this paper we measure the effect of the quota on the difficulty of making decisions 
in the EU-25 Council after the next enlargement. We compute the probability of a proposal 
being rejected in the Council. This probability depends on the voting rule (and therefore on 
the quota) and on the probabilities of the different vote configurations. Here we do not 
consider that all vote configurations are equiprobable, the classical implicit or explicit 
assumption. We assume that vote configurations with a minority of members states in favour 
of the proposal have a null probability, with other vote configurations being equiprobable. 
 




The modi¯cation of the main voting rule in the Council (the so-called quali¯ed majority
rule, or QMV) was one of the main tasks of the last intergovernmental conference held in
Nice in December 2000. The Treaty of Nice speci¯es the following requirements for the new
quali¯ed majority rule for the Council. Weights were allocated for the possible 27 member
states, the weights of the existing member states were modi¯ed, and new weights were
assigned to the 12 potential candidates. For a proposal from the Commission to be passed,
the sum of the weights must reach a certain threshold or quota. This quota is speci¯ed
in the Treaty for two extreme scenarios: for the current Union of 15 members and for an
enlarged Union of 27 members. But "It was impossible to determine at Nice an absolute
¯gure in terms of votes for the QMV threshold for every intermediate con¯guration of the
Union, since it would depend on which candidate states joined the Union in which order"
(Galloway, 2001, p. 83). It was also stipulated that for passing a decision votes in favour
had to be cast by a majority of the members, and an optional "population safety net"
clause must be respected.
The European Council meeting held in Copenhagen in December 2002 concluded with
the completion of accession negotiations with 10 of the 12 potential candidates (for Ru-
mania and Bulgaria accession was delayed). By November 2004 the European Union will
be a Union of 25 members. For this enlarged Union, the quali¯ed majority rule is not
completely speci¯ed. Although the weights of the member states are known, as they were
"set in stone" at Nice, the threshold for passing a proposal remains to be decided. The
choice of the threshold is clearly an important issue: "there is one crucial element that will
remain negotiable: the level of the QMV threshold. This will become a key institutional
battleground in each treaty of accession, as heralded in the declaration on the threshold."
(Galloway, 2001, p. 93).
There exists an extensive academic literature that studies the e®ects of the Treaty of
Nice for the Union of either 15 or 27 members. See, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover
(2001), Leech (2001), Lane and Maeland (2002) or Leech and Machover (2002). A clear
conclusion is that the voting rule will make the acceptance of proposals in the Council more
di±cult. Most approaches rely on the usual choice of considering all vote con¯gurations
equally probable, although the proposals to be voted upon usually require some minimal
previous support. These conclusions, and more basically the approach itself, are challenged
by some practitioners (see, for instance, Mosberg (2002)).
The approach adopted here departs from the classical literature, as we relax the as-
sumption of all possible vote con¯gurations being equiprobable. As any proposal from the
Commission naturally has the support of the Commission, we assume that such proposals
2have the support of more than half the member states. That is, those vote con¯gurations
in the Council that do not have this minimal support are considered as impossible (hav-
ing zero probability), while all vote con¯gurations beyond this threshold are considered
equally probable. With these assumptions on the probabilities of the di®erent vote con-
¯gurations, we compute the probability of a proposal being rejected for a large range of
possible quotas in the EU-25's Council.
2 Basic model
Two separate elements are involved in any collective decision-making process, or voting
situation as we will call it: the voters and the voting rule1. The voting rule speci¯es which
vote con¯gurations are winning, that is, will entail the approval of the proposal, which
otherwise would be rejected. If N = f1;2;::;ng denotes the set of seats (as well as the
voters occupying them), and any vote di®erent from 'yes' is assimilated to 'no', there are
2n possible vote con¯gurations. Each vote con¯guration can be represented by the set
S µ N of 'yes' voters. The cardinal of a vote con¯guration S µ N (i.e., the number of
'yes' voters in it) will be denoted by s. Thus an N-voting rule is fully speci¯ed by the set
W of winning con¯gurations. It is usually assumed that: (i) N 2 W; (ii) ; = 2 W; (iii) If
S 2 W, then T 2 W for any T containing S; and (iv) If S 2 W then NnS = 2 W. The
last condition prevents the possibility of a proposal and its opposite both being passed if
they are supported by two disjoint groups of voters. The cardinal of W will be denoted
by j W j.
We are interested in weighted majority rules here. A weight wi ¸ 0 is associated with




wi < Q ·
P
i2N
wi is given. For
each vote con¯guration S µ N, we denote by w(S) the sum of the weights in favour of
the proposal, that is, w(S) :=
P
i2S
wi. The weighted majority voting rule W speci¯ed by
Q and (wi)i2N is
W = fS µ N : w(S) ¸ Qg:
The voters' behaviour is the second ingredient in a voting situation, but in general it
is not known in advance how voters are going to vote. In our model the voters' behaviour
is represented by a probability distribution over all possible vote con¯gurations, which
can be seen as an estimate of the likelihood of di®erent vote con¯gurations from the
available information. The probability of the vote con¯guration S (i.e., all voters in S
voting 'yes' and those in N n S voting 'no') is denoted by p(S). Thus 0 · p(S) · 1 for
1The basic framework, notation and terminology presented in this section are taken from Laruelle and
Valenciano (2002).
3any S µ N; and
P
SµN
p(S) = 1: This distribution is a black-box-like probabilistic summary
of the voters' behaviour, which re°ects the relative proximity of the voters' preferences,
their relationships, or any contextual information that conditions their voting behaviour,
summarizing it in probabilistic terms.
Thus a voting situation consists of a pair (W;p), where W is a voting rule and p
represents a probability distribution over the vote con¯gurations. From these two inputs,
one can compute the probability of a proposal to be accepted or to be rejected. These are
simply given by





¹ ®(W;p) := Probfrejectiong =
X
S:S= 2W
p(S) = 1 ¡ ®(W;p):
Thus ®(W;p) is a natural generalisation of Coleman's (1971) 'power of a collectivity to act'
by means of rule W, denoted by A(W) and given by the ratio of winning con¯gurations
w.r.t. the total number of vote con¯gurations (2n). Note this is the particular case of
(1) in which all vote con¯gurations are equally probable. That is, denoting by p¤ the







2n = ®(W;p¤): (2)
Coleman's 'power of a collectivity to act' is thus an evaluation of the easiness of
decision-making, and A(W) := 1 ¡ A(W) of its di±culty. This index, like other indices
based on the same probability distribution2, can be justi¯ed on normative grounds as an
a priori evaluation based on the rule itself, ignoring the bias that actual voters would give
to the probability of di®erent vote con¯gurations.
A variant of Coleman's measure of the di±culty of making decisions is Felsenthal and
Machover's (1998, 2001) 'resistance coe±cient', which is the result of re-scaling A(W) in
a way that reaches its minimum (R(W) = 0) for the simple majority rule (if n is odd) and
its maximum (R(W) = 1) for the unanimous rule, and is given by
R(W) :=









The drawback of this a±ne transformation of A(W) is that its probabilistic interpretation
is lost.
2Banzhaf (1965) index, Coleman's (1971) power to intiate and to prevent action, and KÄ onig and
BrÄ auninger's (1998) index can be seen as conditional variants associated with this probability distribution
(see Laruelle and Valenciano (2002)).
4On the other hand, the choice of considering all vote con¯gurations equally probable,
seems unrealistic in the sense that the proposals to be voted upon usually require some
minimal previous support, with A(W) (A(W)) resulting in too low (high) an evaluation of
the easiness (di±culty) to make decisions3. As a compromise between the extreme choice
of equal probability of all vote con¯gurations and the requirement of a minimal degree
of support, it can be assumed that those con¯gurations in which the support is below a
certain level have probability 0; while the rest are equally probable.
3 EU-25 voting rule
The Treaty of Nice redistributed the weights of the member states in the Council and
allocated weights to the candidate countries that were considered at the time of the inter-
governmental conference preceding the Treaty. The weights were allocated for a Union of
27 members (EU-27), but the quota for passing a proposal is speci¯ed only in two cases:
when the EU remains at 15 members (in which case the quota is set at 169 votes) and
when the EU is enlarged to 27 members (in which case the quota will be set at 258 votes).
The Treaty adds a requirement that did not exist previously: acts of the Council will
require (in both cases) that votes in favour of a proposal from the Commission are cast
by at least half of the members of the Council4.
For the EU-25, the distribution of weights and the requirement that half the members
states are in favour of the proposal are clear, but the level of the quota is not settled. The
Treaty only speci¯es that: "Insofar as all the candidate countries listed in the Declaration
on the enlargement of the European Union have not yet acceded to the Union when the
new vote weightings take e®ect (January 2005), the threshold for a quali¯ed majority will
move, according to the pace of accessions, from a percentage below the current one to a
maximum of 73.4%."
The EU-25 voting rule is thus a function of the quota, still unknown. If the "population
safety net" is ignored, it can be modelled as follows:
W1(Q) =
(
S µ N :
X
i2S
wi ¸ Q and s ¸ 13
)
;
3Power indices have often been criticized (see, for instance, Garrett and Tsebelis (1999)) on the basis
that the actual voters' preferences are ignored. In fact, the criticism addresses mainly the particular
distribution of probability p
¤, but the voters' preferences, like any other factors that can in°uence their
voting behaviour, could in principle be included via p in the general model of a voting situation. This would
permit a more realistic assessment of the actual probabilities of a proposal being accepted or rejected.
4In other cases (if the proposal does not come from the Commission) the votes in favour must be cast
by at least two-thirds of the members. We do not consider this case here.
5where n =25 and the weights wi are known and given in Table 1, while the quota can
vary. We consider the whole range of possible quotas. As the total number of votes is 321,
we consider the quotas between 161 and 321. Special emphasis is given to the most likely
quotas, which are around 71% (Q ¼ 228).
The Treaty adds the "population safety net" clause that stipulates: "When a decision
is to be adopted by the Council by a quali¯ed majority, a member of the Council may
request veri¯cation that the Member States constituting the quali¯ed majority represent
at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have
been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted."





S µ N :
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i2S











where Popi is state i's population.
The application of this clause entails two di±culties. The ¯rst one is that the pop-
ulation requirement is not compulsory. It is up to the member states to decide whether
to require it or not. In practice, it is di±cult to predict whether the member states will
invoke this condition5. The second di±culty is technical: in order to check the population
criterion the population ¯gures are necessary, but they do not appear in the Treaty. In
view of these di±culties we consider separately the two rules that result from ignoring or
taking into account this clause.
The data used to compute the probability that a proposal will be rejected are in Table
1, which shows the member states and the candidate states for a Union of 25 members,
with the weights given by the Treaty and their respective populations (data quoted from
Galloway (2001), source EUROSTAT 2000).
As stated in section 2, the second ingredient in a voting situation is the voters' vot-
ing behaviour. The classical implicit or explicit assumption for the assessment of voting
situations is that all voting con¯gurations have the same probability. Although this as-
sumption is justi¯ed for normative purposes, it has been criticized as unrealistic. As stated
5Here a comparison can be made with the 'Ioannina compromise' that raised the possibility of requiring
the Council to ¯nd a solution that can be adopted by at least 65 votes instead of the usual 62 votes.
Nevertheless "the compromise had little practical e®ect on decision-making and has to date only been
threatened or formally invoked (unsuccessfully) before a ministerial vote on rare occasions" (Galloway,
2001, p. 70, also for the framing of the 'compromise').
6i Popi wi
Germany 82165 29

























Table 1: Populations and Weights for EU-25. Source: EUROSTAT 2000 quoted from
Galloway (2001).
7by Mosberg (2002, p. 261): "the vast majority of the millions of theoretically conceivable
coalitions are highly unlikely." This criticism is absolutely right from a positive or descrip-
tive point of view. Here we correct this assumption by excluding some vote con¯gurations
that are sure not to occur. When a proposal from the Commission reaches the Council
it has the support of at least some member states. Thus the probability that all member
states will vote against the proposal must be zero. More generally, we assume that any
proposal that reaches the Council has the support of more than half the member states, as
otherwise it would have been blocked in the Commission. That is, the probability of any
vote con¯guration that represents support below this level is set at zero. In the absence of
any further information on the vote situation we consider that all other vote con¯gurations
are equiprobable. This leads to the distribution of probability on the vote con¯gurations,
~ p(S) :=
(
1=x if s > n
2
0 otherwise,
where x denotes the number of vote con¯gurations where s > n
2. If n is odd, (as happens
to be the case in EU-25) x = 2n¡1, half the total number of vote con¯gurations.
4 Results
The probability of a proposal being rejected has been calculated for di®erent quotas,
assuming the voting behaviour in the Council described by ~ p. That is,




for either rule (i = 1;2) and di®erent quotas6. We consider a range of quotas between 161
and 321, the smallest corresponding to the smallest quota above half the total aggregated
weight, and the largest being the quota that corresponds to the unanimity rule.
In Figure 1 the probabilities of a proposal being rejected for the rule W1(Q) (with only
one additional requirement: number of states), and the rule W2(Q) (with two additional
requirements apart from the quota: population and number of states) are represented for
the di®erent quotas within the speci¯ed range.
6In this case, as n is odd, and for any S 2 W
i(Q) it holds that s >
n
2, for both rules we have
®(W
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Figure 1: Probabilities of a proposal being rejected for W1(Q) and W2(Q)
9As can be seen from Figure 1, these probabilities are clearly sensitive to the quota for
both rules. For W1(Q) this probability goes from 0.2 to nearly 1 for the range of quotas
considered. The change in probabilities is large for quotas smaller than 250. Of course,
with the population requirement (rule W2(Q)), the probability of rejection of a proposal
is larger, going from 0.6 to close to 1 as the quota goes from 161 to the maximum. In this
case the change in probabilities is especially notable between the quota of 180 and that of
250 (passing from 0.60 to 0.98),
The di®erence between these probabilities for either rule is very large for small quotas,
and very much smaller for quotas larger than 200. So with a quota of 161, the population
requirement entails a probability of rejection of 0.6, while relaxing the population require-
ment the probability drops to 0.2, but above a quota of about 215 the probabilities of
rejection for both rules become very close, till for a quota of 237 the population require-
ment no longer plays any role: this requirement is ful¯lled once the other two are met,
and both rules coincide.
As noted in Galloway (2001), prior to the Treaty of Nice, the threshold for achieving
a quali¯ed majority in terms of weighted votes remained practically unchanged for each
successive con¯guration of the EU at around 71% of total votes. In Nice the threshold
was pushed for the ¯rst time above 71.5% in order to secure the position of Spain (see
Galloway, p. 84). In the hypothetical European Union of 27, the threshold would have
been 74.78%. As the Treaty also speci¯es that the maximum threshold is 73.4%, the most
probable quotas will be between 70% (Q=225) and 73.5% (Q=236) of the total number
of votes. For this range of quotas, the di®erence between the two rules is very small, and
the probability of rejection is rather high, ranging from 0.9 to 0.94, and very similar for
both voting rules (indistinguishable in Figure 1, as the di®erences are of the order of 10¡3
or 10¡6).
Figure 2 gives the evolution of the di±culty of a proposal being accepted from 1958
under the same assumption, that is, assuming that only vote con¯gurations in which more
than half the member states support the proposal occur, all such con¯gurations being
equiprobable.
With the sole exception of the 1981 enlargement to EU-10 (after the accession of Greece),
the probability of rejection has increased after every enlargement. For EU-25, the range
of di±culty corresponding to the range of quotas under consideration by the EU (between
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Figure 2: Probabilities of a proposal being rejected from EU-6 to EU-25
11is represented. The next enlargement will thus surely imply a new increase in the di±culty
of making decisions.
5 Conclusion
The main conclusion of the paper is that for the range of most probable quotas, the
probability of a proposal being rejected is rather high, at above 0.9. The paper also
shows that the "safety net" of the population (the possibility of a member to require the
con¯rmation that the member states constituting the quali¯ed majority represent 62%
of the total population) is not very e®ective once the quota is above 70%. This means
that this clause is perhaps unnecessary as it will have little practical e®ect, and makes the
Treaty more complex.
This means that this clause will have little practical e®ect, and is perhaps unnecessary
as it only makes the Treaty more complex.
From the methodological point of view the paper hints at a possible line of further
work. As recognized by a participant in Nice: "Most of the arguments have been based
on marginal situations and extreme con¯gurations of member states. This, more than
any other factor, explains the outcome. The starting point for this can be traced back
to the Amsterdam IGC, where one of the key issues was whether it would be legitimate
to have a quali¯ed majority composed of Council members representing less than 50% of
the Union's population. Even if such a scenario could only occur in a highly improbable
con¯guration of member states in a Union with more than 27 members, it was felt that
the Union must not have a system that even allowed it as a hypothetical possibility."
(Galloway, p. 92). The advantage of the approach taken here is that it permits us to
take into account all possible vote con¯gurations, and in principle it allows us to assign
larger probabilities on the most probable ones. Therefore if data were available on the
actual distribution of probability on the vote con¯gurations, it would allow a reasonable
picture of reality. The main practical di±culty of the approach lies in obtaining these
data, and some research to collecting them would be worthwhile. As a ¯rst step, we have
assumed here that those vote con¯gurations that do not have the support of half the states
have a null probability, and that the others are equiprobable. Although not completely
realistic, this seems closer to reality than the classical assumption according to which all
vote con¯gurations are equiprobable.
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